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INTRODUCTION

SOVEREIGNTY IN A GLOBALIZING,
FRAGMENTING WORLD
CHARLES J. REID JR.*

It was already clear in the summer and fall of 2019, when planning for
this symposium commenced, that the world order was facing strains not
seen since perhaps some of the darker moments of the Cold War. It was
also apparent that the fault lines along which these strains moved fit beneath three rubrics: sovereignty, globalizing (or globalization), and fragmenting (or fragmentation). The events of the succeeding twelve months
have only brought ever greater pressure to bear and greater urgency to come
to terms with the shape of things to come.1
So, we might begin by reflecting on the three main words that compose the title of this symposium—sovereignty, globalization, and fragmentation. These three words represent the theme of this symposium. And while
they might be explained and understood abstractly, abstract definitions are
always sterile and lifeless. Law is a social reality, and to understand legal
terms—how they are used and misused, applied and manipulated—one
must attend to social realities.
I. SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty—we shall start with sovereignty. It is commonly said that
sovereignty in its modern articulations takes its origins in the writings of the
French theorist Jean Bodin (1530–1596) and the English political writer
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). For Bodin, sovereignty was a matter of
logic. There were states; Bodin neither questioned their existence nor
* Charles J. Reid, Jr., JD, Catholic University of America, 1982; JCL, Catholic University
of America, 1985; Ph.D. Cornell University, 1994. Professor Reid has taught at the Cornell University and Emory University Schools of Law; and is currently Professor of Law at the University
of St. Thomas.
1. The allusion to H.G. Wells is deliberate. H.G. WELLS, THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
(1933).
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probed very deeply into the notion of statehood. And states required
governance.2
It was logical, therefore, that the responsibility of governance should
finally culminate at governance’s apex. Sovereignty was, it is not too much
of a stretch to say, the singularity—unitary and indivisible—and the absolute monarch, freed of all constitutional restraint and the source of all law
and right, was its visible manifestation.3
For Hobbes, sovereign power was consequent upon the human desire
to flee life in the state of nature, which in classic formulation was “solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”4 To avoid this calamitous condition, individuals transferred their natural rights of self-governance—which were indefensible at any rate in a “war of all against all”5—to an all-powerful ruler
who promised protection.6 That ruler then secured the safety of the populace, and the coercive tools the ruler employed became the visible manifestation of the ruler’s sovereign power.
In saying all of this, of course, we must avoid the temptation to see
Bodin and Hobbes as precursors to the modern totalistic state. Bodin believed in the right of private property,7 and Hobbes did not mean to unsettle
the traditional English regard for individual rights and liberties.8 Indeed,
Hobbes believed that the people’s own desire to live peaceably under a
beneficent monarch obviated any need for “draconian” government.9 What
matters is merely that Bodin and Hobbes laid the groundwork for the legalist and positivist theories of sovereignty that eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury theorists like John Austin and Jeremy Bentham advanced.
For Austin, legal analysis began and ended with the commands of the
sovereign. There were three elements to the law, as Austin explained it.
First, the sovereign issued a “command.” The sovereign then backed up that
command with the threat of punishment—what Austin called “sanction.”
Third, the law, thus articulated and thus supported, imposed a “duty” or
2. HOWELL A. LLOYD, JEAN BODIN, ‘THIS PRE-EMINENT MAN OF FRANCE’: AN INTELLECBIOGRAPHY 142–46 (2017).
3. Daniel Engster, Jean Bodin, Scepticism, and Absolute Sovereignty, 17 HIST. POL.
THOUGHT 469, 471–72 (1996); Stephen Holmes, Jean Bodin: The Paradox of Sovereignty and the
Privatization of Religion, 30 NOMOS 5, 8–9 (1988).
4. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 65 (J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1914) (1651).
5. Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbes’s War of All Against All, 93 ETHICS 291 (1983).
6. JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 190–97 (1987).
7. JOHN LOCKE ET AL., PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 10 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1978).
8. CHARLES COVELL, HOBBES, REALISM AND THE TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52
(2004).
9. Paul-Aarons Ngomo, Russell Hardin’s Hobbes, in MORALITY, GOVERNANCE, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REFLECTIONS ON RUSSELL HARDIN 111, 126 (Thomas Christiano et al. eds.,
2018).
TUAL
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“obligation” of obedience on those subject to it, a breach of which duty
triggered the imposition of sanctions.10
For Bentham, the sovereign is the ultimate law-making authority in the
state. And the sovereign, at least in theory, exercised total control over all
that went on among those subject to its command. “Not a cook is bid to
dress a dinner,” Bentham wrote, revealing his class prejudice and privilege,
“a nurse to feed a child, an usher to whip a schoolboy, an executioner to
hang a thief, but it is by [the sovereign’s] order.”11
This, then, is sovereignty in what is known as its “internal” aspect: it is
recognition that the lawgiver is the final authority within the state.12 Theorists, however, also identify a phenomenon labeled “external sovereignty”—the independence, security, and autonomy states should rightfully
enjoy within the community of nations.13 The doctrine of external sovereignty viewed states as analogous to persons and held that states, so conceived, belonged to a community. In the same way human persons owed
each other respect and deference in their dealings with one another, the
states that formed the community of nations were expected to do the same.
External sovereignty, it is often said,14 had its start with the Peace of
Westphalia—the series of treaties that brought the Thirty Years’ War to a
conclusion in 1648.15 And while the close relationship between Westphalia
and external sovereignty has been persuasively questioned in recent years,16
it is nevertheless safe to say that external sovereignty’s origins lie in the
later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.17
The idea of external sovereignty quickly captured the imagination of
international lawyers. Indeed, it is safe to say that the concept probably
10. Neil Duxbury, English Jurisprudence Between Austin and Hart, 91 VA. L. REV. 1, 22
(2005); Samuel E. Stumpf, Austin’s Theory of the Separation of Law and Morals, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 117, 119–21 (1960).
11. Quoted in ANNE BRUNON-ERNST, UTILITARIAN BIOPOLITICS: BENTHAM, FOUCAULT, AND
MODERN POWER 59 (2016).
12. Steven Lee, A Puzzle of Sovereignty, 27 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 241, 247 (1997).
13. ERSUN N. KURTULUS, STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONCEPT, PHENOMENON, AND RAMIFICATIONS 63 (2005); Daniel Philpott, Ideas and the Evolution of Sovereignty, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY:
CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 15, 20 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 1997);
Kjell Goldmann, TRANSFORMING THE EUROPEAN NATION-STATE: DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 63 (2001).
14. LUIS CABRERA, POLITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN CASE FOR THE
WORLD STATE 72 (2004).
15. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20 (1948).
16. Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55
INT’L ORG. 251 (2001); Pärtel Piirimäe, The Westphalian Myth and the Idea of Sovereignty, in
SOVEREIGNTY IN FRAGMENTS: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF A CONTESTED CONCEPT 64,
64–80 (Hent Kalmo & Quentin Skinner eds., 2010).
17. See Stéphane Beaulac, The Lotus Case in Context: Sovereignty, Westphalia, Vattel, and
Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40, 46–47 (Stephen Allen et al. eds., 2019) (making the case that Emmerich Vattel (1714–1767) was a decisive
figure in this development).
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reached its highest stage of legal development in the nineteenth century.18
One of its classic formulations can thus be found in the works of Lord
Palmerston, British foreign secretary, prime minister, and political theorist;
the very cynical, very subtle Lord Palmerston wrote: “[E]very nation has a
right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases, so long as it injures not
its neighbours.” And again: “[O]ne nation has no right to control, by force
of arms, the will of another nation in its government or ruler.”19
It is this body of ideas and doctrines that the lawyers of the latter nineteenth century and the pre–World War I years relied upon to develop their
theories of international law. International law came about through consent.
States, like persons, were perfectly free to enter into—or to refrain from
entering into—contracts with their neighbors. These “contracts” became the
treaties and the other agreements that formed the foundation of international
law. It is because states enjoyed such sovereignty, these theorists explained,
that international law was possible.20 Treaties were the basis of international law—treaties that might bind states indefinitely—but that was possible only because states freely and autonomously entered into them.21 But
where state action was not circumscribed by treaty obligations, states were
free to act as they wished. In a sense, the state was personified and, thus
personified, was superimposed upon a contract model of the law.22
This model of international jurisprudence was unsettled by World War
I, in two different ways. First, there were those who denounced the old
system as a failure,23 and who argued that states must come together into an
ever tighter, more all-enveloping world community—the League of Nations, which so captured the imagination of the 1920s.24 Second, there were
those who looked at sovereignty and essentially deconstructed the concept—deconstruction long before the term was even coined. Sovereignty,
they claimed, should be seen as a matter of power relations—rulers over
their peoples, states competing among each other in the international
18. See, e.g., Arnulf B. Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of
Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475 (2010).
19. HENRY J. TEMPLE, OPINIONS AND POLICY OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT PALMERSTON 113 (George H. Francis ed., 1852).
20. ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 47 (2005).
21. Jochen von Bernstorff, Georg Jellinek and the Origins of Liberal Constitutionalism in
International Law, 4 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 659, 667–74 (2012).
22. JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 9 (2016).
23. Hersch Lauterpacht, Westlake and Present Day International Law, 15 ECOMONICA 307,
309–12 (1925).
24. Thus, the theorist Hans Kelsen argued for the creation of a civitas maxima—a “world
state”—that might keep international order. Danilo Zolo, Hans Kelsen: International Peace
Through International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 306, 309–10 (1998). Robert Lansing, formerly the
secretary of state under Woodrow Wilson, argued for the creation of international organizations
that would effectuate the “sovereign will of mankind.” Robert Lansing, Notes on World Sovereignty, 15 AM. J. INT’L L. 13, 26 (1921).
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arena.25 At best, sovereignty should be seen not in conceptualist terms but
as an ongoing process, a series of negotiations, express or implicit, between
the governors and those who are governed. Harold Laski and Léon Duguit
were important representatives of this movement.26
The aftermath of World War II further unsettled traditional ideas of
sovereignty and its relationship to the international order, at least for a
while. The enormity of the slaughter, the viciousness and comprehensiveness of the genocides, caused the post–World War II world to recoil in
horror. “Never again,” world leaders agreed, at least for a time. War-crimes
tribunals were established to try the leadership of both Nazi Germany and
Imperial Japan under the rubric of crimes against humanity.27 The United
Nations was created in the hope that it might succeed where the League of
Nations failed—as a supervising body intended to secure collective action
against threats to the peace of the global community.28
In the final analysis, however, the loftiest visions and hopes of the
immediate postwar period foundered on the hard realities of the Cold War.
Blocs of nations competed against each other: the United States, Great Britain, and other members of the Western Alliance of World War II faced off
against their former partner, now turned adversary, the Soviet Union, which
found support not only among the occupied nations of Eastern Europe but
also among many nations in the developing world. In this climate of fierce
global competition, the United Nations quickly became a stalemated body
on all important issues, and older ideas of state sovereignty and state autonomy reemerged. And so too did age-old ideas about power politics and
competition among states. The grim Hans Morgenthau captured the climate
of the age when he wrote that “[t]he tendency to dominate, in particular, is
an element of all human associations” and should be acknowledged as such
by the international order.29
25. CÉCILE LABORDE, PLURALIST THOUGHT AND THE STATE IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE,
1900–25 103 (2000).
26. Laski viewed sovereignty not as an abstraction but as a constantly shifting balance of
power among the various constituent elements of society. See HAROLD J. LASKI, AUTHORITY IN
THE MODERN STATE 19 (1919). For Duguit, sovereignty depended less on force than on “the belief
of its subjects that their rulers perform[ed] their functions.” LÉON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN
STATE 43 (Frida and Harold Laski trans., 1919).
27. Hersch Lauterpacht and Raphael Lemkin were among the most important international
lawyers making this case. See Ana F. Vrdoljak, Human Rights and Genocide: The Work of Lauterpacht and Lemkin in Modern International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1163 (2009). More generally, the community of international lawyers borrowed from the ideals articulated in the seemingly
quixotic Kellogg-Briand Pacts to outlaw war, signed in 1928. See OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT
J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE
WORLD (2017).
28. Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the
United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 783 (1948).
29. HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
35 (5th ed. 1972).
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The Cold War, however, endured for only four decades, even if it felt
like a permanent reality at the time. Between the years 1989 and 1991, the
whole edifice erected by the Soviet Union first tottered and then collapsed.
Indeed, the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist altogether at the end of the
year 1991.
II. GLOBALIZATION
The conclusion of the Cold War, then, ushered in the second part of
this story: the rise of a movement known as “globalization.” In a sense, a
globalized world has always been with us. In the ancient world, trade routes
connected the Roman Empire both with China30 and with Scandinavia.31
Globalization as a term of art, however, acquired specialized significance
beginning in the 1980s and 1990s.32
There were two elements to globalization as it was conceived in those
early days of the project. One set of concerns centered on what might be
broadly labeled “human rights.” Two events in the early 1990s crystallized
the demand for a globalized response to human-rights violations. These
were the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively.
Beginning in 1991, war broke out in the former Yugoslavia, which, over a
period of years, fragmented into seven smaller states—Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia. In
the course of the war, Serbian forces, in particular, committed acts of mass
murder, most especially against the Bosnians.33 Similarly, in 1994, Rwanda
broke into open civil conflict, as one ethnic group—the Hutus—rose up and
slaughtered members of a rival group—the Tutsis.34
Both of these conflicts led to the empaneling of tribunals charged with
investigating and punishing war crimes and genocide. These judicial proceedings brought about the development of what can only be called a transnational body of law governing these offenses.35 What stands out is the
independence enjoyed by the tribunals. The composition of the judges was
deliberately international, and the body of norms they produced did not re30. Marco Galli, Beyond Frontiers: Ancient Rome and the Eurasian Trade Networks, 8 J.
EURASIAN STUD. 3 (2017); Michael P. Fitzpatrick, Provincializing Rome: The Indian Ocean Trade
Network and Roman Imperialism, 22 J. WORLD HIST. 27 (2011).
31. Jennifer Billock, Follow the Ancient Amber Road, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/follow-ancient-amber-road.
32. The term may well have been coined by Theodore Levitt. See Theodore Levitt, The
Globalization of Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1983, at 92–102.
33. See PAUL MOJZES, BALKAN GENOCIDES: HOLOCAUST AND ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (2011).
34. See, e.g., Paul Magnarella, The Background and Causes of the Genocide in Rwanda, 3 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 801 (2005).
35. On the Balkans, see, for example, Vojin Dimitrijeviæ & Marko Milanoviæ, The Strange
Story of the Bosnian Genocide Case, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 65 (2008). On Rwanda, see Amanda
Alexander, New Histories and New Laws: Crimes Against Humanity at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 801 (2019).
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ceive state ratification in any traditional sense, although the tribunals did
depend on state governments to implement the punishments they
imposed.36
The prosecution of the perpetrators of genocide and war crimes has
continued, even expanded in recent years. Thus in 2012, the Liberian political leader Charles Taylor was convicted of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.37 Similarly, the International Criminal Court in The Hague has
conducted ongoing investigations for fifteen years into the genocide committed in the Darfur region of Sudan, and in February 2020, the Sudanese
government agreed to transfer Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, the leader
most responsible for these offenses, into the custody of the ICC.38
This recent experience with vigorous prosecution of genocide and war
crimes teaches at least three lessons. First, robust norm formation can take
place outside the context of the nation-state. Second, the law itself may be
moving in a direction away from unrestrained intrastate violence and toward the recognition of transnational norms of decency and good conduct.
Third, we must, however, not get our hopes too high. Politics and strategic
positioning remain important forces. There is little doubt that Saudi leaders
would face the same fate as Slobodan Milosevic for their actions in Yemen
were they ever to be brought to justice, but the likelihood of that happening
is remote, thanks to their important superpower protectors and their control
of the strategically important petroleum market.39
36. On this process of norm-making, see, for example, M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996); Johan
D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
286 (1999).
37. Kai Ambos & Ousman Njikam, Charles Taylor’s Criminal Responsibility, 11 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 789 (2013); Marlies Glasius, “It Sends a Message”: Liberian Opinion Leaders’ Response to the Trial of Charles Taylor, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 419 (2015).
38. Omar al-Bashir: Sudan Agrees Ex-President Must Face ICC, BBC (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51462613.
39. Daniel Larison, Dozens of Civilians Killed in Another Saudi Massacre, AM. CONSERVATIVE (July 17, 2020, 2:06 PM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/state-of-the-union/dozens-of-civilians-killed-in-another-saudi-massacre; Mohamad Bazzi, America Is Likely Complicit
in War Crimes in Yemen: It’s Time to Hold the US to Account, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:19
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/03/yemen-airstrikes-saudi-arabiambs-us; Charles Pierson, Yemen Continues Its Decent into Hell, COUNTERPUNCH (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/09/12/yemen-continues-its-descent-into-hell; Sudarsan
Raghavan, U.N. Report Says U.S., Britain, France May Be Complicit in Potential War Crimes in
Yemen, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2019, 12:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-report-says-us-britain-france-complicit-in-potential-war-crimes-in-yemen/2019/09/03/ad278cf6ce48-11e9-9031-519885a08a86_story.html; Richard Hall, New Report Alleges Saudi Arabia Covered Up War Crimes in Yemen, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 15, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-yemen-airstrikes-war-crimes-covera9061061.html; Cesar Chelala, The War in Yemen Is Not a War, It Is a Massacre, DEF. DEMOCRACY PRESS (Nov. 27, 2018), http://www.defenddemocracy.press/the-war-in-yemen-is-not-a-warit-is-a-massacre; Fred Hiatt, Opinion, Will You Work for a Murderer? That’s the Question a Host
of Ex-generals, Diplomats and Spies May Soon Face, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2018, 5:16 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/are-we-willing-to-sacrifice-our-moral-
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Even outside the genocide and war-crimes context, claims of humanrights violations have been made with increasing force and effectiveness.
Such claims played a prominent role in the unrest that led to the toppling of
the Vladimir Putin–sponsored president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, in
early 2014.40 Allegations of human-rights abuses were similarly used to
justify the forcible removal of Muammar al-Gaddhafi from power in Libya,
although the Libyan situation was not made better by his departure.41
Thus, sovereign authorities who once could suppress civil conflict or
abuse their subjects without fear of retribution must now at least pause to
reflect that the world community might muster the resources needed to hold
them to account. They might be violently removed from power and die at
the hands of their enemies, like Gaddhafi.42 Or, like Slobodan Milosevic,
the belligerent Serbian leader responsible for so many atrocities, they might
even die in prison.43
The second main element of the globalization of the last thirty years
might be called economic liberalization. Like its human-rights counterpart,
economic liberalization has also had an impact on traditional ideas of sovereignty. Consider foreign exchange. There was a time—in the years before
World War II—when the value of currency was seen as a matter of solemn
state responsibility.44 The first quarter century or so of the post–World War
II era witnessed a continuation of these policies under the so-called Bretton
standing-for-this/2018/10/12/baf7bff6-ce42-11e8-a3e6-44daa3d35ede_story.html; Robert Fisk, Is
Yemen Too Much for the World to Take?, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 27, 2016), https://
www.counterpunch.org/2016/10/27/is-yemen-too-much-for-the-world-to-take; Robert Fisk, Saudi
Arabia “Deliberately Targeting Impoverished Yemen’s Farms and Agricultural Industry”, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 23, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudiarabia-s-bombing-yemeni-farmland-disgraceful-breach-geneva-conventions-a7376576.html.
40. See, e.g., Taras Kuzio, Vigilantes, Organized Crime, and Russian and Eurasian Nationalisms: The Case of Ukraine, in UKRAINE’S EUROMAIDAN: ANALYSES OF A CIVIL REVOLUTION 57,
57–60 (David R. Marples & Frederick V. Mills eds., 2015); Timothy Snyder, Ukraine: The New
Dictatorship, N.Y. REV. (Jan. 18, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/01/18/ukrainenew-dictatorship; Michael P. Mayko, Local Ukrainian Churches Pray for Kiev: Recent Immigrants Are Worried About Their Families Back Home, STAMFORD ADVOC. (Feb. 22, 2014, 1:01
AM), https://www.stamfordadvocate.com/news/article/Local-Ukrainian-churches-pray-for-Kiev5257499.php.
41. Indeed, Eric Posner cites the failure to contemplate the aftermath of Gaddhafi’s removal
from office as a reason for caution in deciding whether to remove a regime for its human-rights
violations. ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 132 (2014).
42. Which, it has been alleged, might in itself qualify as a human-rights violation. Nathan
Kensey, Scapegoating the Guilty: Girard and International Law, in VIOLENCE, DESIRE, AND THE
SACRED VOLUME 2: RENÉ GIRARD AND SACRIFICE IN LIFE, LOVE AND LITERATURE 67, 77 n.18
(Scott Cowdell et al. eds., 2012).
43. Peter Beaumont, Slobodan Milosevic Dies Alone with History Still Demanding Justice,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2006, 7:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/12/war
crimes.milosevictrial.
44. See generally Barry Eichengreen, The Comparative Performance of Fixed and Flexible
Exchange Rate Regimes: Interwar Evidence, in BUSINESS CYCLES: THEORIES, EVIDENCE AND
ANALYSIS 229 (Niels Thygesen et al. eds., 1991) (reviewing the diversity of currency practices in
the 1920s and 1930s).
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Woods system. The product of an agreement forged in 1944 among the
leading western allied powers—Canada, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and even the Soviet Union participated in the negotiations45—
Bretton Woods was meant to govern international currency markets after
the war.46 (The Soviet Union did not, in fact, sign the final documents.)47
Two pillars sustained the world that Bretton Woods created—the US
dollar and a commitment to a fixed dollar value for gold. Prices and exchange rates remained relatively stable, at least for a while, but the edifice
became unsustainable by the 1960s, when it became apparent that the connection between the dollar and gold could no longer be maintained.48 No
surprise, then, that in 1971 the system was left in tatters when President
Richard Nixon withdrew from the agreement and allowed the value of gold
and the dollar to float, thereby ushering in a period of floating exchange
rates and relative currency valuations.49
Floating exchange rates and the free mobility of capital have now
come to dominate the period since 1989. Even a supporter of this system—
the German economist Horst Siebert— conceded that “[i]nternational capital mobility limits national governments’ freedom of action and changes the
opportunity costs of economic policy decisions.”50 Even so, Siebert lauded
the effect capital mobility would have on state behavior—everything from
providing security for property rights to creating a friendly tax
environment.51
Similarly, tariffs were once seen as an important instrument of industrial policy.52 That certainly was the case historically in the United States.
Alexander Hamilton recommended the adoption of a tariff in his Report on
Manufactures (1791) to shield embryonic American industry from a United
Kingdom eager to regain through trade what it had lost in the American
45. BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON WOODS: JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HARRY DEXWHITE, AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 9–15 (2013).
46. David M. Andrews, Bretton Woods: System and Order, in ORDERLY CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS SINCE BRETTON WOODS 6, 6–7 (David M. Andrews ed., 2008).
47. G. John Ikenberry, The Political Origins of Bretton Woods, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE
BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 155, 197–98
(Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993) (comments of Edward M. Bernstein).
48. Barry Eichengreen, The Monetary Role of Gold as the Original Sin of Bretton Woods, in
BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENTS: TOGETHER WITH SCHOLARLY COMMENTARIES AND ESSENTIAL
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 38, 39–40 (Naomi Lamoreaux & Ian Shapiro eds., 2019).
49. Id. at 52.
50. Horst Siebert, What Does Globalization Mean for the World Trading System?, in FROM
GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 137, 148
(The WTO Secretariat ed., 2000); cf. COLLEEN LUNDY, SOCIAL WORK, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO PRACTICE 4 (2d ed. 2011) (“Within the context of
increased mobility of capital, power has shifted even further from nation-states to transnational
corporations . . . .”).
51. Siebert, supra note 50, at 149.
52. MARK A. MARTINEZ, THE MYTH OF THE FREE MARKET: THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN A
CAPITALIST ECONOMY 127–28 (2009).
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War of Independence.53 While Hamilton’s proposals were fairly moderate
in scope, generations of American political leaders, from Henry Clay54 to
William McKinley,55 looked to protective tariffs as a far more aggressive
tool of industrial policy.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II, however,
protective tariffs fell into disrepute. They were seen as part of the “beggar
thy neighbor” policies that in the 1930s led to a downward spiral of employment and production.56 Accordingly, the immediate postwar period
witnessed two efforts to come to an international agreement on tariffs and
trade. The International Trade Organization (ITO) was the first (failed) attempt to reach an accord.57 When the ITO foundered in the United States
Senate, negotiators crafted a second, successful agreement, known as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).58
Intended as a temporary expedient, GATT actually provided the legal
framework for a series of tariff reductions until it was superseded in 1994
by the more comprehensive World Trade Organization (WTO).59 GATT—
and the WTO—have depended on several key premises. First, export subsidies should be discouraged if not wholly eliminated.60 By subsidies, it is
meant governmental support for domestic industries competing in international markets.61 Such subsidies might enjoy real domestic popularity. Politicians justify their use by claiming that they maximize the well-being of a
particular political community by artificially lowering the price of a domestically produced good, either by directly financing production of the good,
or by devices like tariffs meant to raise the price of foreign goods.62 Since
local constituencies are often benefited by such practices, WTO oversight
of such matters does not always meet with political approval.
53. Douglas A. Irwin, The Aftermath of Hamilton’s “Report on Manufactures,” 64 J. ECON.
HIST. 800 (2004).
54. WILLIAM R. NESTER, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POLICIES (1998);
WILLIAM E. BENSON, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE TARIFF, 1789–1861, 73–85 (2010); Charles K.
McFarland & Nevin E. Neal, The Nascence of Protectionism: American Tariff Policies,
1816–1824, 45 LAND ECON. 22 (1969).
55. QUENTIN R. SKRABEC, WILLIAM MCKINLEY, APOSTLE OF PROTECTIONISM 90 (2008).
56. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, KEYNESIAN VS. MONETARISM: AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FINANCIAL HISTORY 287–88 (1985) (providing a careful contextualization of America’s tariff policy
in the 1930s).
57. Richard Toye, Developing Multilateralism: The Havana Charter and the Fight for the
International Trade Organization, 1947–1948, 25 INT’L HIST. REV. 282 (2003); George Bronz,
The International Trade Organization Charter, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1948).
58. Francine McKenzie, GATT and the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional Development, and the Western Alliance, 1947–1959, 10 J. COLD WAR STUD. 78 (2008).
59. Id.
60. PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS 179–81 (2007).
61. James Rude, Direct and Indirect Export Subsidies, in HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE POLICY 282, 282–91 (William A. Kerr & James D. Gaisford eds., 2007).
62. Arvind Panagariya, Evaluating the Case for Export Subsidies, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 2276 (2000).
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Another key premise is antidiscrimination. In principle, foreign trade
should involve fair competition over price and quality of goods.63 Discrimination—favoring the goods of one nation over those of another for political
or other reasons—violates this basic principle.64 Again, however, as with
export subsidies, there is a substantial domestic constituency for such discrimination, as Buy American efforts attest to.65
Third, the system depends on the idea of comparative advantage. Some
states might, for instance, be better at the production of agricultural products, others at the extraction of raw materials, yet others at the production of
finished manufacturing goods. Each of these three premises, finally, are
manifestations of a kind of Grundnorm (“foundational norm”), and that is
the belief that economic efficiency is the greatest and highest good and that
all other subsidiary goods must yield before it.66 These principles were
foundational to the operation of the GATT, and they have proved every bit
as central to the WTO.
If the post–Cold War period has witnessed the renewed growth of
human-rights law and the law of international trade, it has also seen the
proliferation of international tribunals designed to administer these bodies
of norms and procedures. There is now an Inter-American Court of Human
Rights,67 an African Court of Justice and Human Rights,68 and a European
Court of Human Rights.69 In the background are yet other, older, well-established tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court70 and the International Court of Justice (often known alternatively as the “World Court”)
(these latter two courts have jurisdiction that ranges far outside the scope of
human rights—the Criminal Court’s competency including both violations
of the person’s rights in time of war but also the legitimacy of other acts of
war, such as cross-border attacks and blockades;71 and the Court of Jus63. Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global Governance, 16
UCLA J. INT’L L. FOREIGN AFFS. 209, 223–26 (2011).
64. Nicolas F. Diebold, Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law, 60
INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 831 (2011).
65. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13881, 84 Fed. Reg. 34257 (July 15, 2019).
66. “Competition policy and trade policy pursue the common objective of promoting an efficient functioning of markets.” Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem: On the ‘Domestic Policy Functions’ of International Trade Rules, in THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 121, 121 (Robert Howse & Petrus von Bork
eds., 1998).
67. See generally JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2013).
68. See generally THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES (Charles C. Jalloh et al. eds., 2019).
69. See, e.g., SHAPING RIGHTS IN THE ECHR: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Eva Brems & Janneke Gerards
eds., 2013).
70. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST
FOR JUSTICE (William Driscoll et al. eds., 2004).
71. See generally STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Morten Bergsmo & Ling Yan eds., 2012); Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression for the International Criminal
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tice’s authority embracing such matters as boundary disputes and access to
natural resources).
The WTO also contemplated the use of judicial proceedings to advance its goal of trade free not only of tariff barriers but also of all sorts of
nontariff barriers. These nontariff barriers are many in number and might
include, to cite one nonexhaustive list, “trade regulations, standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs formalities, and government procurement practices,” and many other concerns besides.72 Efforts to subject
such barriers to international norms might meet with significant local opposition, but nevertheless enjoyed real progress. So much so, that in 2016
Robert Howse surveyed the evolution of the WTO’s dispute-resolution
mechanisms and wrote confidently of “global government by judiciary,” as
the WTO’s “judicial branch” “entertain[ed] hundreds of claims and
produc[ed] a vast jurisprudential acquis.”73
Of course, a mere four years later, we know that this process of standardizing not only international trading rules but also domestic practices
has met with a fierce reaction on the part of sovereign states. Indeed, the
entire WTO judicial system has been thrown into doubt as the American
president, Donald Trump, refuses to cooperate in appointing new members
to the WTO Appellate Body, causing the judicial process essentially to
freeze.74
In light of this deepening chill, it may be difficult to remember that
just a few short years ago, scholars wrote seriously about the ways in which
human-rights norms and the rules and practices of international trade were
merging into a kind of “global constitutionalism.”75 The concept and terminology of global constitutionalism have been around for some decades. As
long ago as the period between the 1930s and the 1950s, Alfred Verdross, a
former student of Hans Kelsen and a distinguished Austrian law professor
in his own right, developed the body of ideas that became “global
constitutionalism.”76
But this concept truly flowered in the two decades that followed the
Cold War’s demise. Writing in 2009, Karolina Milewicz proposed the exisCourt, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1 (2001); Benjamin Ferencz, Enabling the International
Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 551 (2007); Matthew D.
Campbell, Bombs over Baghdad: Addressing Criminal Liability of a U.S. President for Acts of
War, 5 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 235 (2006).
72. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 741 (3d ed. 2005).
73. Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 10 (2016).
74. Keith Johnson, How Trump May Finally Kill the WTO, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 9, 2019,
9:58 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/09/trump-may-kill-wto-finally-appellate-bodyworld-trade-organization.
75. See generally Aoife O’Donoghue, Alfred Verdross and the Contemporary Constitutionalization Debate, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 799 (2012).
76. Id.
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tence of a global constitutional order characterized by three “elements:” “a
continuous and lasting process;” “a formal dimension that denotes some
procedural and institutional norms, . . . that is, the rule of law;” and “a
substantive dimension associated with the guarantee of fairness and security.”77 Four years earlier, in 2005, Deborah Cass argued that the free-trade
system structured and shaped by the WTO was developing constitutional
characteristics as international lawyers and judges used both free-trade principles and noneconomic concerns like the environment and democratic legitimacy to build a transnational legal order.78 In 2009, Jan Klebbers and
coauthors made similar claims for the entire international system.79
III.

FRAGMENTATION

That was then. In the decade since these authors waxed rhapsodic, the
world has shifted on its axis, dramatically so. And this brings us to the
fragmenting/fragmentation aspect of this symposium. The world has been
globalizing, but it has also been coming apart at the seams. The dimensions
of the crisis are actually quite enormous. Any effort to describe the range of
seemingly insoluble problems now confronting the world may seem arbitrary and incomplete. Still, we shall assume that risk and propose four converging crises that collectively are shaking the foundations of the post–Cold
War world order.
These are respectively: a pervading crisis of political and constitutional
legitimacy in the United States of America, a crisis of separatism in the
United Kingdom and the European Union brought on by Brexit, a crisis in
the international judicial order, and the crisis of a new destabilizing and
highly dangerous arms race among the superpowers.
A. The American Crisis
The United States that emerged from the Cold War’s conclusion
seemed like a colossus. It was described as a “global hegemon,” the world’s
unquestioned final authority.80 The period itself was said to be a “unipolar
moment.”81 The world, on this account, did not have competing poles of
power, but only one—the United States.
To be sure, on paper, the United States still enjoys great power. Its
military retains unquestioned supremacy, and the dollar remains the global
77. Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalism: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 16 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 413, 416 (2009).
78. DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (2005).
79. JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
80. See, e.g., Bruce E. Moon, The United States and Globalization: Struggles with Hegemony, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER 342, 342–52 (Richard Stubbs &
Geoffrey R.D. Underhill eds., 2000).
81. Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN AFFS. 23 (1990).
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reserve currency. Thanks to American chokeholds on the international
banking system, when the United States seeks to impose economic sanctions on another nation, those sanctions have real bite.82
But a close inspection suggests a Potemkin-like quality to the structure. It looks like a charade, a moldering facade standing atop an eroded
foundation. Thus David Klion, writing in Foreign Policy in April 2019,
compared the United States to the doddering last days of the pre–World
War I Ottoman Empire. “The American Empire is the Sick Man of the
Twenty-First Century,” Klion wrote. Policy is bought and sold, and the dismantling of campaign finance restrictions has led to the “legalization of
corruption . . . on a scale unheard of in other developed countries.”83
Indeed, Klion understates the matter. It is a simple fact that the United
States has failed at the most elementary task of a modern democratic
state—ensuring that the person who receives the most votes actually wins
office. Twice in sixteen years—thanks to the inexcusable survival of an
eighteenth-century anachronism, the Electoral College—the United States
has actually installed as president the candidate who received fewer votes
than his nearest competitor.84 (And as this issue goes to print, we have
witnessed an assault on the United States Congress instigated by a president
whose objections to a “rigged vote” have been made entirely in bad faith.)85
The constitutional crisis is bad enough, but it is only one factor in a far
more pervasive set of social pathologies that have infected American life.
The United States is experiencing declining life expectancies86—a phenomenon last experienced by a modern state in the turmoil of Russia in the
1990s, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. A crisis of inequality—
of race, wealth, and class—is coming to a boil in the summer of 2020, as
82. GERALD A. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE IN AN AGE
INEQUALITY: SOFT CURRENCIES, HARD LANDINGS 190 n.1 (2018).
83. David Klion, The American Empire Is the Sick Man of the 21st Century, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Apr. 2, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/02/the-american-empire-is-the-sickman-of-the-21st-century; cf. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (relaxing standards of public corruption); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down restrictions on campaign fundraising).
84. In 2000, Vice President Al Gore received approximately 530,000 more votes than George
W. Bush. In 2016, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton received nearly 3,000,000 more votes
than Donald Trump. Bush and Trump were declared the winners by the Electoral College.
85. Donald Trump Suggests Delay to US Presidential Election, BBC (July 30, 2020), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53597975; cf. Steven Calabresi, Trump Might Try to Postpone Election. That’s Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/07/30/opinion/trump-delay-election-coronavirus.html?auth=login-google (authored by the
cofounder of the Federalist Society, the article calls for Trump’s re-impeachment).
86. Over the last three years for which comprehensive data are available—2014 through
2017—life expectancy in the United States has declined from 78.9 to 78.6 years. The impact falls
disproportionately on the poor and those unable to access health care. See Aylin Woodward, Life
Expectancy Keeps Going Down: A New Study Says America’s Worsening Inequality Could Be to
Blame, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2019, 7:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-life-expect
ancy-declined-for-third-year-in-a-row-2019-11; ANNE CASE & ANGUS DEATON, DEATHS OF DESPAIR AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 1–15 (2020).
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the United States confronts its legacy of white racism and police misconduct. The disparate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic—falling disproportionately on racial minorities and poorly compensated, cruelly exploited
“essential workers”87—is yet another manifestation of America’ inequality
crisis. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to say that the present situation is taking
on the trappings of a real crisis of legitimacy.88 If in the eyes of many, the
American state stands for the preservation of privilege, for the exploitation
or degradation of the weak and vulnerable, for the denial of human rights
and dignity, then it makes the summer-long effort to tear down statues—the
bronze and concrete reminders of state power—more explicable.
Given all of this, can the United States maintain its position as global
hegemon and guarantor of world order? The question is made all the more
acute by America’s spectacular failure to address the COVID-19
pandemic.89
B. Brexit and the Crisis of Separatism
Brexit might have its deep causes in rising British discontent with the
United Kingdom’s increasingly close connections with the European Union
in the post–Cold War period.90 It was felt in many quarters of the United

87. Nick Vachon, OSHA Complaints Show the Morbid Dangers Healthcare Workers Face
During Covid, IN THESE TIMES (July 16, 2020), https://inthesetimes.com/article/osha-healthcarecovid-19-pandemic-nurses-danger; Richard A. Oppel Jr. et al., The Fullest Look Yet at the Racial
Inequity of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html; Don Bombino Geno Tai et al., The
Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Racial and Ethnic Minorities in the United States, 72
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 703 (2020); Cedric Hugrée et al., Workers Are on the Frontline of
a Second Wave of COVID-19, JACOBIN (June 13, 2020), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/06/
jobs-pandemic-working-class-inequality; Anthony Pahnke, Appreciated or Exploited? Key Workers in a Coronavirus World, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/
2020/3/26/appreciated-or-exploited-key-workers-in-a-coronavirus-world.
88. Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-pro
tests-crowd-size.html; Lonnae O’Neal, Black Lives Matter Has Moved from the Political Outskirts
to the Center of America’s Conversation About Itself, UNDEFEATED (June 16, 2020), https://
theundefeated.com/features/black-lives-matter-has-moved-from-the-political-outskirts-to-thecenter-of-americas-conversation-about-itself.
89. Pankaj Mishra, Flailing States, LONDON REV. BOOKS (July 16, 2020), https://
www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v42/n14/pankaj-mishra/flailing-states; Aris Roussinos, Covid Has Exposed America as a Failed State, UNHERD (June 1, 2020), https://unherd.com/2020/06/covid-hasexposed-america-as-a-failed-state.
90. Pompeo Della Posta & Scheherazade S. Rehman, Brexit: Origins and Future Perspectives, in AFTER BREXIT: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 11, 11–34 (Nazaré da Costa
Cabral et al. eds., 2017); Bruce Stokes, Brexit Vote Highlighted U.K.’s Discontent with EU, but
Other European Countries Are Grumbling Too, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 24, 2016), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/24/brexit-vote-highlighted-uks-discontent-with-eu-butother-european-countries-are-grumbling-too.
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Kingdom that parliamentary supremacy was being eroded in favor of ever
more expansive European powers to regulate human rights and trade.91
The more proximate cause of Brexit, on the other hand, was the decision by then British prime minister David Cameron to call for a referendum
on the subject in response to political pressure to do so.92 Cameron’s confidence that the British public would support his professed desire to remain
within the European Union, however, was dashed when in June 2016, the
“Leave” option won a narrow victory.93
What matters for our purposes are not the details of the campaign or
subsequent negotiations of a deal to depart the European Union, but the
rising chorus in favor of sovereignty, as opposed to a tighter relationship
with Europe, which, yes, did require the surrender of aspects of Britain’s
internal and external sovereignty.
In the months leading up to the referendum, the vote came down to a
choice: deeper integration with world nations (in the form of the European
Union) or a return to an autonomous, sovereign Britain freed from what
were seen as intolerable constraints. The editors of the Economist saw this
clearly three months before the vote occurred: “[T]he argument that Britain
has lost sovereignty, and even its democracy, by being in the European
Union is at the heart of the case for Brexit.”94 Writing a few months after
the referendum, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard concurred: “The elemental purpose of Brexit is and has always been to restore the supremacy of Parliament—and to return legal authority to British courts.”95 In January 2020,
when Boris Johnson finally secured parliamentary support to depart the European Union,96 the prime minister spoke enthusiastically of Britain’s “recaptured sovereignty.”97
When Ambrose Evans-Pritchard or Boris Johnson speaks of sovereignty, of course, one is entitled to ask what this means. It means at least
this: a strategically important part of the British public saw Brexit as a
means of attaining a greater measure of independence, of self-rule, of local,
91. Stefania Baroncelli and Monica Rosini, Brexit, Sovereignty, and Devolution: The View of
Constitutional Law, in THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF BREXIT 56, 60–61 (Annette Bongardt et
al. eds., 2020).
92. RUDOLF G. ADAM, BREXIT: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 60–61 (2020).
93. Tim Ross, The Long War: How Vote Leave and the Eurosceptics Won, TELEGRAPH (June
25, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/25/the-long-war-how-vote-leave-and-theeurosceptics-won.
94. Dreaming of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 2016), https://www.economist.com/brit
ain/2016/03/19/dreaming-of-sovereignty.
95. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Supremacy of Parliament Is the Whole Point of Brexit, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 3, 2016, 8:00 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/11/03/supremacy-ofparliament-is-the-whole-point-of-brexit.
96. Eleni Courea, UK Leaves the European Union, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2020, 12:00 AM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-leaves-the-european-union.
97. Eleni Courea, Boris Johnson Heralds “Recaptured Sovereignty” After Brexit, POLITICO
(Jan. 31, 2020, 11:05 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/boris-johnson-heralds-recaptured-sov
ereignty-after-brexit.
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dare we say it, democratic accountability. But one must not lose sight of
Brexit’s dark side. There is also the xenophobia, the anti-immigrant fever,
the desire to grab at some dimly remembered, grainy image of national
greatness.98
No one yet knows where this is going, nor is it our business to try and
discern Britain’s future path. What matters is that in this tug-of-war between the forces of globalism and of deeper integration, it was the countervailing force of sovereignty that prevailed. Fuzzy, ill-thought-out, romantic,
nostalgic, undoable, undesirable, one can call it what one wishes, but one
must still account for this centrifugal force, pushing things and events to an
edge where blowups become foreseeable. Nor is Britain alone. Within postBrexit Britain there is still a substantial Scottish independence movement.99
And on the European continent, one must acknowledge the Catalan independence movement, seeking to free the province of Catalonia from control
by the central Spanish government.100 Again, what one sees is not globalization but its opposite, fragmentation, yet another example of the breakup
of the post–Cold War order of convergence through trade and respect for
human rights.
C. The Diminishment and Disregard of Transnational Tribunals
At the heart of the movement for globalization was belief that it would
be led by an enlightened judiciary. Human rights, trade, the coming global
constitution, all were predicated on increasing deference to and respect for a
world judiciary. This principle, however, is at the moment badly battered.
One might consider two examples. The first is the case of the Appellate Body of the WTO. The Appellate Body was—and remains at least in
theory—an indispensable part of the WTO. Its membership consists of
seven judges.101 Its responsibilities include determining the appropriate
standard of review; arriving at an understanding of the relevant legal princi98. Josh Gabbatiss, Brexit Strongly Linked to Xenophobia, Scientists Conclude, INDEPEN(Nov. 27, 2017, 5:52 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/brexit-prejudicescientists-link-foreigners-immigrants-racism-xenophobia-leave-eu-a8078586.html; Ian Johnston,
Brexit: Anti-Immigrant Prejudice Major Factor in Deciding Vote, Study Finds, INDEPENDENT
(June 22, 2017, 10:38 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-racism-immi
grant-prejudice-major-factor-leave-vote-win-study-a7801676.html; Joseph Brean, Brexit’s Driving Force: Middle England’s Desire to Return to an Almost Mythical Past, NAT’L POST (June 24,
2016), https://nationalpost.com/news/world/brexits-driving-force-middle-englands-desire-to-re
turn-to-an-almost-mythical-past.
99. See, e.g., Robin McKie & Toby Helm, Plaudits for Nicola Sturgeon Fuel Talk of Scottish
Independence Drive, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2020, 2:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2020/jul/19/plaudits-for-nicola-sturgeon-fuel-talk-of-scottish-independence-drive.
100. See generally RAPHAEL MINDER, THE STRUGGLE FOR CATALONIA: REBEL POLITICS IN
SPAIN (2017).
101. Victoria Donaldson & Alan Yanovich, The Appellate Body’s Working Procedures for
Appellate Review, in THE WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 386, 387–91 (Giorgio Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006).
DENT
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ples; reviewing the findings and decisions of subordinate tribunals; and finally passing judgment on them, usually in the form of written opinions.102
The decisions of the Appellate Body still require another layer of approval—by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.103 But once that is done,
the Appellate Body’s rulings are final. Its authority was described in 2016
as simultaneously “extensive” but “fragile.” It had acquired real expertise
and international status and respect, but this earned reputation for competency was simultaneously imperiled by shifting political winds.104
Those winds have now shifted. The Trump administration arrived in
Washington, DC, determined to rewrite the rules of international trade and
essentially took the WTO Appellate Body hostage, metaphorically speaking.105 Since appointments to the Appellate Body require American approval, Trump resolved to approve no new appointments.106 In December
2019, the membership of the Appellate Body dropped to a single judge,
meaning that the body now lacks a quorum to resolve disputes. The Appellate Body, in other words, has ceased to function and is likely to remain
nonfunctional for the foreseeable future.107
The shutting down, if not the outright destruction, of the WTO Appellate Body’s adjudicative powers thus represents one line of assault on the
world’s judicial bodies. A second major assault was launched by China in
response to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision in the South
China Sea Arbitration case, also known as The Republic of the Philippines
v. the People’s Republic of China.108 The dispute arose because of China’s
claim of sovereignty over a large part of the South China Sea—a claim that
102. See generally Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Nicolas Lockhart, Standard of Review in WTO
Law, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 491 (2004).
103. Zhu Yanle, The Effects of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body Reports: Is the Dispute Settlement Body Resolving Disputes Only, or Making Precedent at the Same
Time?, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 221, 222 (2003).
104. Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig, & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of
the WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237 (2016).
105. As WTO Members Meet in Argentina, the Organisation Is in Trouble, ECONOMIST (Dec.
9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/12/07/as-wto-members-meetin-argentina-the-organisation-is-in-trouble; Adam S. Posen, The Post-American World Economy:
Globalization in the Trump Era, 97 FOREIGN AFFS. 28 (2018).
106. See The WTO Warns of the Risk of ‘Paralysis’ of the Institution by the United States,
NOTICIAS FINANCIERAS, Feb. 20, 2018.
107. Johnson, supra note 74; BRANDON L. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE WTO APPELLATE BODY LOSES ITS QUORUM: IS THIS THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE “RULES-BASED
TRADING SYSTEM”? (2019); cf. Chad P. Brown, There Is Little Dignity in Trump’s Trade Policy:
Workers Were Never at the Heart of the President’s Plans, FOREIGN AFFS. (July 9, 2020), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-09/there-little-dignity-trumps-trade-policy
(explaining that Trump is likely to fail even at his stated goal of improving the condition of
American workers). There is reason to believe that the Biden administration will reverse course.
See, e.g., Doug Palmer, Biden Administration Joins Call for ‘Swift Appointment’ of New WTO
Head, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/29/biden-world-trade-or
ganization-463820.
108. Republic of the Phil. v. Republic of China, Case No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2016), https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf.
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often goes by the shorthand expression “Nine Dash Line,” so-called after a
line drawn on a 1948 map China published asserting its claim.109
The proximate cause of the dispute between the Philippines and China
concerned possession of the Spratly Islands, a collection of tiny, uninhabited islands and reefs, perhaps as many as six hundred altogether, most no
more than bits of rock and coral, that straddle important sea lanes but are
also a potentially rich source of natural resources.110 Possession of the islands had been an unresolved question following the conclusion of World
War II.111 The Philippines based its claim of sovereign right on the proximity of the Spratlys to the Philippine coast; China pointed to the fact that the
islands lay within the Nine Dash Line as asserted by China in 1948.112
In 2013, the Philippines chose to adjudicate its claim before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. China objected to the court’s jurisdiction, alleging that by treaty the matter should be subject to bilateral negotiation.113
The Permanent Court rejected China’s position and proceeded to a final
verdict even though China never submitted to be bound by the result.114 In
the event, the Philippines prevailed on its claim, with the decision being
issued in 2016.115
China, however, has remained recalcitrant. Indeed, it rejected the
court’s decision just as it had the court’s jurisdiction,116 and it has now
begun to actively occupy portions of the Spratlys. It has built up some reefs
into artificial islands and has used other islands as stopping points for the
Chinese Navy.117 China, in other words, has behaved as if the Permanent
Court of Arbitration—and, more generally, international law—did not ex109. S. Jayakumar et al., The South China Sea Arbitration: Laying the Groundwork, in THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: THE LEGAL DIMENSION 1, 8 (S. Jayakumar et al. eds., 2018).
110. Charles S. Hutchinson & V.R. Vijayan, What Are the Spratly Islands?, 39 J. ASIAN
EARTH SCIS. 371 (2010).
111. China had used the islands as fishing grounds for centuries prior to World War II. The
French lay claim to the islands in the 1930s. The Japanese Navy occupied the islands during the
war. It was agreed following the war that the islands should be returned to their rightful owner, but
it remained unclear whether that was the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, or the
Philippines. Ross Marlay, China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands, 23 ASIAN AFFS.: AN
AM. REV. 195, 200–03 (1997).
112. Brian K. Murphy, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and International Law, 1
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 187 (1995); Marlay, supra note 111.
113. Wim Muller, China’s Missed Opportunity in South China Sea Arbitration, CHATHAM
HOUSE (Mar. 19, 2015) (no longer available online).
114. Ankit Panda, Philippines v. China: Court Rules Favorably on Jurisdiction, Case Will
Proceed, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 30, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/philippines-v-china-courtrules-favorably-on-jurisdiction-case-will-proceed.
115. Id.
116. Isaac B. Kardon, China Can Say “No”: Analyzing China’s Rejection of the South China
Sea Arbitration, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 1 (2008).
117. Frances Mangosing, New Photos Show China Is Nearly Done with Its Militarization of
the South China Sea, INQUIRER.NET (Feb. 5, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.inquirer.net/specials/
exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea (“[R]eefs . . . transformed into artificial islands in
the final stages of development into air and naval bases.”).
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ist. As with the American decision to suffocate the WTO’s Appellate Body,
we see here also a choice made by the world’s emergent superpower to
ignore the processes of law in favor of self-help.
The hope that the world’s few superpowers would agree to be governed by a global rule of law is thus imperiled equally by American belligerence over trade and Chinese assertiveness over foreign territory.
D. A New and Uncontrolled Arms Race
If we traveled backward in time to the 1990s, we would find, of
course, the United States standing tall as the global hegemon. But we would
also find the two nations that have become America’s rivals in today’s competitive environment showing real signs of weakness. The Soviet Union
broke up in 1991, fracturing into fifteen nations, from Armenia to Uzbekistan, with the Russian state emerging as the largest of the states.118 The
Russian people were demoralized.119 Alcoholism and premature deaths of
despair skyrocketed.120 A regional civil war involving the Russian republic
of Chechnya broke out in 1994 (the so-called First Chechen War).121 The
United States, for its part, mishandled the situation. The economic “shock
therapy” prescribed by western free-market economists might (or might not
have) accomplished some good, but the lives of ordinary Russians were not
improved, and the public mood soured toward the West.122
It was out of this milieu that Vladimir Putin emerged at the end of
1999 as Russia’s leader. And while his precise constitutional office has
shifted several times during his rulership of the Russian state,123 it is fair to
say that he has been, for most of his time on the public stage, the unquestioned strong man of Russia.124 While much could be said about Putin’s
ambitions for Russia, this much suffices: he views the breakup of the Soviet
118. Sabrina P. Ramet, Introduction to CENTRAL AND SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN POLITICS SINCE
1989, at 3–4 (Sabrina P. Ramet ed., 2010).
119. Masha Gessen, The Dying Russians, N.Y. REV. (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.ny
books.com/daily/2014/09/02/dying-russians.
120. See, e.g., Vladimir Shkolnikov et al., Changes in Life Expectancy in Russia in the Mid1990s, 357 LANCET 917, 917–21 (2001); A.V. Nemtsov, Alcohol-Related Human Losses in Russia
in the 1980s and 1990s, 97 ADDICTION 1413, 1413–25 (2002); Peder Walberg et al., Economic
Change, Crime, and Mortality Crisis in Russia: Regional Analysis, 317 BMJ 312, 312–18 (1998).
121. Gail W. Lapidus, Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya, 23 INT’L SEC. 5
(1998).
122. LYNN D. NELSON & IRINA KUZES, RADICAL REFORM IN YELTSIN’S RUSSIA: POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 178 (1995); NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE
OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 310–31 (2007).
123. He has variously been prime minister, president, prime minister a second time, and now
president, potentially until the year 2036. Ann M. Simmons & Georgi Kantchev, Russians Vote
for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2020, 3:43 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russians-set-to-approve-radical-overhaul-that-could-keep-putin-inpower-until-2036-11593593621.
124. Anastasia Edel, Putin’s Constitutional Tsarism, N.Y. REV. (July 9, 2020), https://
www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/07/09/putins-constitutional-tsarism.
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Union and the 1990s as a period of national humiliation;125 he sees Russia
as a great nation with a distinctive culture centered on a militant, conservative interpretation of Russian Orthodoxy;126 and he wishes to restore Russia
to the international preeminence it once enjoyed.127
China, similarly, in 1991 had recently experienced political upheaval.
Protests in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989 gradually transformed
into a crisis of the regime,128 which led finally to violent suppression on
June 3–4, 1989.129 Still, this disruption proved but a temporary impediment
to China’s rise as an economic power throughout the 1990s and early
2000s.130
In 2013, Xi Jinping assumed the leadership of the Chinese state with a
vision of transformational change.131 Most significantly, China’s constitutional ordering underwent significant modification. In 2018, term limits
were removed from the office of the presidency, essentially making Xi
125. As long ago as 2005, Putin called the breakup of the Soviet Union the “catastrophe of the
[twentieth] century.” See Andrew Osborn, Putin: Collapse of the Soviet Union Was “Catastrophe
of the Century,” INDEPENDENT (Oct. 6, 2011, 5:43 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/putin-collapse-soviet-union-was-catastrophe-century-521064.html. He continues to
reiterate these views today. See, e.g., Putin, Before Vote, Says He’d Reverse Soviet Collapse If He
Could: Agencies, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russiaelection-putin/putin-before-vote-says-hed-reverse-soviet-collapse-if-he-could-agenciesidUSKCN1GE2TF. Indeed, he has taken steps to rehabilitate Joseph Stalin. Irina Sherbakova,
Vladimir Putin’s Russia Is Rehabilitating Stalin: We Must Not Let It Happen, GUARDIAN (July 10,
2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/10/vladimir-putin-russiarehabilitating-stalin-soviet-past.
126. Aris Roussinos, Putin’s Cathedral of War Embodies His Civilisation State, UNHERD
(June 18, 2020), https://unherd.com/thepost/putins-cathedral-of-war-embodies-his-civilisationstate; Mark Armstrong, Russian Orthodox Church Consecrates Huge Cathedral Dedicated to Military, EURONEWS (June 14, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/14/russian-orthodoxchurch-consecrates-huge-cathedral-dedicated-to-military; Chrissy Stroop, Putin Wants God (or At
Least the Church) on His Side, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 10, 2018, 9:33 AM), https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/10/putin-wants-god-or-at-least-the-church-on-his-side; David Horsey,
Putin’s Anti-Gay Laws Set the Stage for an International Battle, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2013, 5:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/topoftheticket/la-na-tt-putins-antigay-laws-20130814story.html; John P. Burgess, The Unexpected Relationship Between U.S. Evangelicals and Russian
Orthodox, CHRISTIAN CENTURY (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.christiancentury.org/article/features/
unexpected-relationship-between-us-evangelicals-and-russian-orthodox.
127. Fiona Hill & Clifford G. Gaddy, Vladimir Putin as Statist: Restoring the Greatness of
Russia, BROOKINGS (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/02/01/vladimir
-putin-as-statist-restoring-the-greatness-of-russia.
128. ANDREW J. NATHAN, CHINA’S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 15 (1990).
129. JEANNE BODEN, THE WALL BEHIND CHINA’S OPEN DOOR: TOWARDS EFFICIENT INTERCULTURAL MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 70 (2008).
130. See, e.g., ELISABETH CROLL, CHINA’S NEW CONSUMERS: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND DOMESTIC DEMAND 31–52 (2006); Linda Yueh, China’s Growth: A Brief History, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Dec. 9, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/chinas-growth-a-brief-history; Fatima-Zohra Er-Rafia,
How Did China Become the World’s Second Economic Power?, RISING POWERS IN GLOB. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 17, 2018), https://risingpowersproject.com/how-did-china-become-the-worldssecond-economic-power.
131. ELIZABETH ECONOMY, THIRD REVOLUTION: XI JINPING AND THE NEW CHINESE STATE
3–5 (2018).
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Jinping president if not for life, then for an indefinitely long time.132 Xi
Jinping Thought, furthermore, was enshrined as a constitutional principle,
alongside the Thought of Chairman Mao Zedong and the Thought of Deng
Xiaoping.133 Under Xi’s leadership, finally, China is now attempting to
change the strategic balance of power that has prevailed since the 1990s, at
least within its perceived sphere of influence in East Asia.
Both Russia, in its quest to return to a dominant position on the world
stage, and China, with its desire to alter the regional landscape, have found
it necessary to challenge American military supremacy.134 They both perceive that American military power represents probably the single biggest
supporting pillar for the geopolitical status quo. And they understand that to
change that status they must pursue modern, sophisticated weapons systems
for which the Americans have no apparent ready answer.135
Thus Russia has not only developed and now deployed hypersonic
missiles that travel at Mach 27, a speed that negates American missile defenses.136 Russia is also developing a nuclear-powered cruise missile that, if
perfected, would possess unlimited range and stealth capabilities, permitting it to strike essentially without warning anywhere in the world.137 Indeed, Vladimir Putin has boasted, “[n]ow we have a situation that is unique
in modern history when they are trying to catch up to us.”138 The Chinese
have also developed hypersonic weapons with a particular eye on American
132. Frank Ching, China and Xi: More Powerful by the Day, EURASIA REV. (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://www.eurasiareview.com/16032018-china-and-xi-more-powerful-by-the-day-analysis.
133. Id.
134. AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45861, RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: DOCTRINE,
FORCES, AND MODERNIZATION (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf; Cynthia Roberts,
Revelations About Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy, WAR ON THE ROCKS (June 19, 2020),
https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/revelations-about-russias-nuclear-deterrence-policy; Full
Text: China’s National Defense in the New Era, XINHUANET (July 24, 2019), http://
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm.
135. Dietmar Pieper, The Nuclear Risk Is “Higher Than It Has Been Since the Darkest Days
of the Cold War, DER SPIEGEL (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/un-offi
cial-the-nuclear-risk-is-higher-than-in-the-darkest-days-of-the-cold-war-a-ab05df08-f79e-4f68a86a-a74688c4cb90.
136. Kyle Mizokami, Russia’s New Hypersonic Weapon Flies at Mach 27, POPULAR MECHS.
(Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a30346798/russia-new-hy
personic-weapon-mach-27; Franz-Stefan Gady, Russia’s Avangard Hypersonic Warhead Officially Enters Service, DIPLOMAT (Dec. 27, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/russias-avangard-hypersonic-warhead-officially-enters-service.
137. David Axe, Why Russia’s Nuclear Powered “Skyfall” Missile Is Bad News, NAT’L INT.
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-russias-nuclear-powered-skyfall-mis
sile-bad-news-90116.
138. Vladimir Putin: Russia Has Edge in New Weapons, POLITICO (Dec. 24, 2019, 8:13 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/24/vladimir-putin-russia-weapons-089713; Joseph
Trevithick, Here’s the Six Super Weapons Putin Unveiled During Fiery Address, DRIVE (Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/18906/heres-the-six-super-weapons-putin-un
veiled-during-fiery-address.
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aircraft carrier battle groups stationed in the eastern Pacific.139 Russia and
China—as well as the United States—are also building up cyber capabilities for use in a possible hybrid war.140
Prescinding from the political question whether continued American
global military dominance is either desirable or possible, the conclusion is
certainly unavoidable that the status quo is being disrupted in ways that
could end catastrophically, whether by choice or by inadvertence. Again,
what we encounter—whether we talk about the fragile health of the global
hegemon, or the shattering of long-standing relationships like that of the
United Kingdom and the EU, or the rising disregard for international tribunals, or heightened military instability—is the emergence of a more fragmented world, a world that no longer looks like the inviting, converging
global condominium theorists and politicians alike imagined it to be a mere
three decades ago.
IV. THE CONTRIBUTORS
A. Raj Bhala
And this brings us to the articles that make up this symposium. Each of
the authors has sought to address some aspect of the tripartite theme that
was set for them: sovereignty, globalism, and fragmentation. Raj Bhala is
among the most prolific of international law scholars in the United States.
He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has written extensively in the area of international trade.141 A convert to Catholicism and a
member of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, he has also written on Is139. Bill Powell, China’s Hypersonic Missiles, aka “Carrier Killers,” Are a “Holy S**t Moment” for US Military, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 3, 2019, 8:33 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/chinashypersonic-missiles-aka-carrier-killers-are-holy-st-moment-us-military-1462794.
140. Sue Halpern, How Cyber Weapons Are Changing the Landscape of Modern Warfare,
NEW YORKER (July 18, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/how-cyberweapons-are-changing-the-landscape-of-modern-warfare; Cynthia Brumfield, Russia’s Sandworm
Hacking Group Heralds New Era of Cyber Warfare, CSO (Nov. 22, 2019, 8:07 AM), https://
www.csoonline.com/article/3455172/russias-sandworm-hacking-group-heralds-new-era-of-cyberwarfare.html; Michael J. Mazarr et al., The Emerging Risk of Virtual Society Warfare, RAND
CORP. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2714.html; David E. Sanger
& Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Escalates Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/trump-cyber-russia-grid.html; Maria Ellers, How
America’s Cyber Strategy Could Create an International Incident, NAT’L INT. (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/how-americas-cyber-strategy-could-create-internationalcrisis-90526; Lyu Jinghua, What Are China’s Cyber Capabilities and Intentions?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR WORLD PEACE (Apr. 1, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/01/whatare-china-s-cyber-capabilities-and-intentions-pub-78734.
141. RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK (5th ed. 2019).
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lamic law142 and maintains a steady commentary on legal developments in
India.143
At one level, Bhala’s article is concerned with curricular reform.144 If
we teach international law, or work within the field, we should want the
next generation of scholars and practitioners to be the best possible. And
that means that we must use tools that address the major problems confronting the field today.
For Bhala, there is no greater threat confronting the world order than
the rise of nationalism.145 Nationalism poses a threat not only to international law but also to world order. Indeed, if we look around, we can see its
poisoned fruit in many places. Victor Orban’s appeals to nationalist impulses are notorious. Under his rule, Hungarians have grown intolerant of
Muslims, Jews, and Roma.146 Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister, is
another example of toxic nationalism. Modi has both exploited and aroused
Hindu nationalism and directed it against the Muslim Indian minority in
some despicable ways.147
Nationalism, Bhala asserts, is the product of “ignorance” and
“prejudice.”148 One might add that it grows in a climate of parochialism and
provincialism and that it leads to narrow-mindedness: without knowing
why, the provincial person rejects the foreign, the strange, the other. On the
other hand, Bhala distinguishes nationalism from patriotism.149 Patriots
love their country, but they are not uncritical of it. They are self-aware, they
are alert to their prejudices and blind spots, and they work to remedy them.
How then do we educate to safeguard against the threat of nationalism? How do we inculcate authentic patriotism? Bhala begins his response
by looking to religious faith, specifically his own deeply felt Catholic
142. RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI’A) (2011).
143. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Reserve Bank of India, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CENTRAL BANKING 68, 68–93 (Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa Maria Lastra eds., 2018); Raj Bhala, India at 71: Can
India Fill a China Trade Gap?, BLOOMBERG QUINT (Aug. 13, 2018, 3:58 PM), https://
www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/india-at-71-can-india-fill-a-china-trade-gap.
144. Raj Bhala, Combatting Nationalism by Applying Catholic Teaching and Studying Iran’s
Constitution, 17 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 521–610 (2020).
145. Id. at 526–31.
146. Dorothy Manevich, Hungarians Share Europeans’ Embrace of Democratic Principles
but Are Less Tolerant of Refugees, Minorities, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 30, 2016), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/30/hungarians-share-europes-embrace-of-democraticprinciples-but-are-less-tolerant-of-refugees-minorities; William Echikson, Victor Orbán’s AntiSemitism Problem, POLITICO (May 13, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-anti-semitism-problem-hungary-jews.
147. See THOMAS A. HOWARD, Hindu Nationalism Against Religious Pluralism: Or, the
Sacralization of Religious Identity and Its Discontents in Present-Day India, in FAITH IN A PLURALIST AGE 62, 62–78 (Kaye V. Cook ed., 2018); Azeem Ibrahim, Modi’s Slide Toward Autocracy, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 13, 2020, 12:11 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/13/modiindia-hindutva-hindu-nationalism-autocracy.
148. Bhala, supra note 144, at 524.
149. Id. at 524–25.
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faith.150 Patriotism, Bhala continues, is consistent with the revealed truth of
religion, although nationalism is not. Thus, he reflected on the story of the
Three Wise Men—in fact, the Gospel of Matthew is silent as to their number—as a story of transcendence of boundaries.151 In tradition, the Three
Wise Men were representatives of far-flung nations and cultures who joined
together to give homage to a Jewish baby born in poverty and obscurity.
Cooperation, synthesis, difference subsisting within a larger architectonic
whole—this is how Bhala reads the passage.152
And Bhala’s reading of the Three Wise Men becomes a key for appreciating the whole of his contribution. He uses it to answer the question of
how we transcend the narrowness of our horizons.153 After all, even the
most well-traveled human being has only just glimpsed the smallest part of
the world’s richness and variety. Like the Wise Men, we must be prepared
to leave behind the familiar and respond imaginatively and sympathetically
to the larger world around us. The Wise Men, after all, according to tradition, hailed from different corners of the world—from Persia, from Arabia,
and from Turkestan—but they journeyed together, cooperatively seeking a
larger synthetic vision of God and humankind.
Still relying on Catholic social thought, Bhala makes plain that the
patriot is the one who seeks to achieve this synthesis in her own life. She
knows that she must reach beyond narrow boundaries to rescue and welcome refugees, to love the immigrants and the new arrivals, always knowing that every person is worthy of respect because every person is “a
unique, unrepeatable, and priceless creature created in the image and likeness of God.”154
If this is how Catholic social thought teaches us to act, Bhala stresses,
it also informs us on what must be avoided. Nationalism—with its partiality, its line drawing, its hatred of those outside the tribe, its suspicion of
strange folkways and distant customs—is (not to put too fine a point on it)
sinful. It is the repudiation of the authentically religious experience reflected in the universal vision of the Wise Men.155
Returning to the topic of curricular reform, Bhala makes the point that
Catholic social thought should be, for the professor if not necessarily for the
student, a wellspring of empathy. It gives the professor the tools to imaginatively place herself in another person’s context and to feel and think with
that individual.156
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 526–31.
Matthew 2:1–12.
Bhala, supra note 144, at 526–27.
Id. at 527.
Bhala, supra note 144, at 530.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
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Much of the remainder of Bhala’s article is taken up with an exercise
in empathy. Indeed, he proposes an empathetic reading of the Iranian constitution. He acknowledges at the outset that Iran represents a threat to
global peace. He knows better than to apologize for the Iranian political
order. He will not excuse Iranian misdeeds. But he wants to investigate the
Iranian constitution for what it can tell us about a social and political order
that is very different from ours: How are rights and duties allocated? How is
the government structured? He acknowledges the temptation to read the Iranian constitution cynically, as justification for expansionist policies in the
Middle East and beyond, but he counsels that we should move beyond wellknown hostilities and look at it like genuinely curious external observers.
What he wants to do, in other words, is to “see America through official
Iranian eyes.”157
Bhala’s review of the Iranian constitution and the value system it reflects and embodies is deep and thorough. Thus, following a clear-eyed
analysis of the Constitution’s preamble, Bhala suggests points that might be
developed in a proposed curricular reform. One might emphasize and distinguish the place of Shari’a law in the Constitution with the enlightenment
values embodied in our own constitutional tradition. One might inspect the
document for the ways Islam and Islamic values pervade the text. One
might look at Iranian governing structures—the Guardian Council, the
place and position of Islamic jurists—for evidence of the way a concern for
doctrinal consistency informs the government’s official words and deeds.
Bhala’s analysis is a masterpiece—in its detail, in its command of the subject, and in the way it demonstrates to the law professor ways in which a
very different worldview might be incorporated within classroom presentation. “Empathy,” Bhala concludes, “is vital in this pedagogical process.”158
And Bhala’s own empathetic presentation of his subject matter is a master
class in how it might be achieved.
B. Jeremy Rabkin
Jeremy Rabkin is a professor of law at the Scalia Law School at
George Mason University. Prior to his appointment at George Mason, he
taught for many years at Cornell University in the Politics Department. He
came eminently well qualified for our symposium. He has thought deeply
on questions of sovereignty and international relations for more than two
decades. In Why Sovereignty Matters,159 he states the case for viewing the
Constitution as an important safeguard against the imposition of extraconstitutional international standards on the United States. To be sure, Rabkin
is no Henry Cabot Lodge. He is a committed internationalist. But America’s
157. Id. at 537.
158. Id. at 609.
159. JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (1998).
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international commitments, Rabkin insists, must always conform to constitutional principle.160
These are themes that Rabkin further develops in two subsequent
books. In The Case for Sovereignty,161 Rabkin explains that sovereignty is
not about the exercise of unlimited or capricious power. Rather “[i]t [is]
precisely about the control of force.”162 In other words, sovereignty functions as a necessary attribute for the rule of law and constitutional order.
And in Law without Nations,163 Rabkin synthesizes his earlier work to argue that ideals like democratic governance and self-rule can be realized
only within sovereign states and to assert further that under the theories of
global governance then in vogue it is difficult to identify where precisely
responsibility rested for any particular administrative decision.164
Rabkin’s contribution to this symposium adapts his insights to explore
the relationship of sovereignty and nationalism.165 These two ideas are
often conflated, but Rabkin insists that they be kept separate and distinct.
Sovereignty is essentially a legal concept. Its origins are traceable to the late
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the indeterminate political structures
of the middle ages yielded to the more sharply defined principalities and
states that followed the Lutheran Reformation and the challenge that represented to European unity. Sovereignty, as a legal concept, has been the subject of theorizing by generations of scholars—Jean Bodin and Thomas
Hobbes, of course, but also the great international jurists, like Hugo Grotius
and Samuel Pufendorf.166
Nationalism, on the other hand, is a nineteenth-century movement.
Where sovereignty, as Rabkin describes it, was a product of keen legal theorizing, nationalism was an emotion, a passion, something that arose from
the heart.167 Rabkin points out that while many scholars of the past wrote
on sovereignty, there were very few who defended nationalism as a concept.168 Indeed, Rabkin might have added that nationalism received its
highest expression not in scholarship but in music. The great nationalists of
the nineteenth century were the composers. One thinks of Bedrich Smetana
(1824–1884) and Má Vlast; Giuseppe Verdi (1813–1901) and Nabucco; and
160. Id. at 12–14; cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (a case whose language Rabkin borrows from to state his case for strong constitutional safeguards).
161. JEREMY RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: WHY THE WORLD SHOULD WELCOME
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004).
162. Id. at 14.
163. JEREMY RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2007).
164. Id. at 18–44.
165. Jeremy Rabkin, Sovereignty as a Brake on Nationalism, 17 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 611–624
(2020).
166. Id. at 612.
167. Id. at 616.
168. Id. at 616–17.
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Ignacz Paderewski (1860–1941) and his Symphony in B Minor (the
Polonia).
In the modern world, however, since World War II, Rabkin asserts,
sovereignty and nationalism unavoidably intersect. And in that intersection,
the hope is that sovereignty plays “an inherently moderating force.”169 Indeed, a well-constructed sovereign power might be able to transcend tribal
passions pulsing within the political community and ensure that even states
with multiple and different partisan groups or ethnic minorities might work
not to the advantage of one or another group but to the common good of all
concerned.
C. David Sloss
David Sloss is the John A. and Elizabeth H. Sutro Professor of Law at
Santa Clara University. He is the author and editor of several important
works of international law. In the Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement, Sloss assembled a team of scholars to engage in a comparative
study of the role courts play in protecting the rights of citizens under treaties to which their home nations are parties.170 Twelve nations, representing
a broad cross section of international development and experience, were
surveyed, among them states like Canada, Germany, South Africa, India,
and Israel. Sloss and his collaborators determined that among the nations
surveyed, the United States stands out as the only nation whose courts have
declined to follow international trends in favor of more robust treaty
enforcement.171
In International Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, Sloss and his
coeditors produced a remarkably strong and thorough collection of studies
examining the question of the court and international law—public and private, treaty-based and customary—from the Founding to the present.172 In
The Death of Treaty Supremacy, Sloss looks at a major, but little noticed,
shift in Supreme Court practice, that is, its refusal in the years after World
War II to require states to enforce treaty obligations solemnly undertaken
by the United States. He traces this refusal to the reluctance, on the part of a
virtually all-white federal judiciary, to use the Charter of the United Nations
and other broad commitments to human rights as a device for overturning
racially discriminatory state laws.173
169. Id. at 622.
170. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2009).
171. Id.
172. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (David L.
Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
173. DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE (2016).
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David Sloss’s contribution to the symposium is tightly reasoned and
compact, but it nevertheless contains much valuable insight. He begins with
a jurisprudential insight. There are those who view law—its interpretation
and application—as a self-contained process.174 Thus, one finds a lawgiver
who promulgates the law and courts that interpret and construe those texts
in a self-referential process. What are the words of the text? What are their
meanings? How do they fit the case at hand? Self-contained. Narrow and
precise. Faithful to the rule of law.175
This is the logic of a school of thought Sloss labels “sovereigntist.”176
A paradigm sovereigntist opinion is Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Atkins v.
Virginia.177 On Scalia’s model, the law of the nation-state is whole and selfcontained. To introduce norms drawn from external sources is more than
wrong, it is an offense against sovereignty and democratic order since the
American people have never consented to be governed by foreign law.
Sloss proposes that the sovereigntist model is flawed because it does
not fit what courts actually do. In his words, it is “descriptively inaccurate.”178 Sloss challenges the sovereigntist position in three different ways.
First, he looks to the practice of other nations. What he finds are states that
are continually revisiting and revising their written constitutions. And in so
doing, they do not act in isolation from the world. Rather, there exists a
body of experts who work with nongovernmental organizations, political
parties, and government agencies, who stand ready to give guidance.
“Transnational norm entrepreneurs,” Sloss calls them at one point.179 What
we see at the level of international constitutional development, in other
words, is an ongoing process of borrowing, adapting, and cross-fertilization.
Second, American courts have resisted this practice, especially since
the Second World War.180 The judiciary—following public opinion—
feared that by opening the door to international norms, documents like the
United Nations Charter might supplant American law. This fear was especially acute—Sloss summarizes the argument he makes at greater length in
The Death of Treaty Supremacy—on the subject of racial discrimination
and segregation.181 A virtually all-white judiciary was not prepared to use
the law of the United Nations to overturn Jim Crow and the many racist
principles embedded within American law.182
174.
(2020).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

David L. Sloss, Sovereignty and National Constitutions, 17 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 625–40
Id. at 625.
Id.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Sloss, supra note 174, at 625.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 636–37.
Id. at 637.
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Third, even though the American courts eschewed overt reliance on
foreign constitutional principles, transnational ideals have nevertheless influenced the course of legal development. We “should not confuse lack of
citation for lack of influence,” Sloss writes.183 Between 1948 and 1976, the
Supreme Court “federalized human rights through a process of silent incorporation.”184 Transnational norms have thus prevailed in many ways, Sloss
concludes, even if the court made sure to leave no fingerprints.185
D. Michael O’Sullivan
Michael O’Sullivan is a native of Ireland who has been trained in both
political theory and international finance. He has kept a foot in both worlds,
serving variously as a professor at Princeton University and as an advisor
and strategist at UBS and at Credit Suisse. His book The Levelling: What’s
Next after Globalization represents a masterful synthesis of these disciplines, as O’Sullivan seeks to discern the future.186 Globalization is dead,
he boldly announces, and the world that comes after will be multipolar,
featuring competing approaches to governance. Some nations, he suggests,
will retain, or develop, democratic institutions, but these nations will face
stiff competition from less-open alternatives, with top-down administrative
structures.187
In his contribution to this journal, O’Sullivan expands on the thesis he
has articulated in The Levelling. Globalization is over. If 1991 marked its
hopeful beginning—that was the year the Soviet Union dissolved and markets opened worldwide—then the COVID summer of 2020 marks its
death.188
To be sure, O’Sullivan knows better than to say that COVID actually
killed globalization. Rather, his point might be explained by an analogy. It
is now commonplace among economic historians to assert that the stock
market Crash of late October 1929 was not the cause of the Great Depression. The economy had been stalling for months, the debts of the 1920s had
come due, and the Crash was more symptom, or correlation, than cause. To
be sure, however, the Crash was an accelerant. It made matters inestimably
worse.
And that is O’Sullivan’s point about COVID. COVID is likely to
“hasten our path down the road toward a multipolar world.”189 For sure,
O’Sullivan is not utopian in his thinking, but neither is he dystopian. The
183. Id. at 638.
184. Sloss, supra note 174, at 640.
185. Id. at 640.
186. MICHAEL O’SULLIVAN, THE LEVELLING: WHAT’S NEXT AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2019).
187. Id.
188. Michael O’Sullivan, Globalization Dies and Gives Way to a Multipolar World Order, 17
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 641–48 (2020).
189. O’Sullivan, supra note 186, at 645.
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road ahead, he acknowledges, is likely to offer a bumpy ride. Not only
COVID but also climate change and a host of intractable problems await on
the other side. A multipolar world may not be a stable place. Instead of
broadly tolerant liberal states we may see—indeed we are already witnessing—the emergence of so-called civilizational states, such as China, Russia,
and India, that look to history, tradition, language, and all the shared markers of a common cultural identity as the glue that binds society together.190
Little room exists there for outsiders. Just ask the Uighurs of Xinjiang province.191 But O’Sullivan nevertheless comes across as an optimist. Yes,
COVID is “an appalling humanitarian crisis,” but humankind has seen
worse and emerged stronger for it.192
E. Paul B. Stephan
Paul B. Stephan is the John C. Jeffries Distinguished Professor of Law
at the University of Virginia. Over the course of four decades, he has written widely on many legal topics. There were his early works on the law of
taxation193 and his contributions first to an understanding of Soviet law and
now more recently on Russian law.194 And then there is the body of work
he has produced in international law. Thus, he is the reporter for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.195
Finally, he is the editor and author of numerous books on the law of international trade.196
Paul Stephan’s contribution to this symposium is divided into three
sections, the first of which is entitled “Rethinking Sovereignty.”197 That
190. Amitav Acharya, The Myth of the “Civilization State”: Rising Powers and the Cultural
Challenge to World Order, 34 ETHICS & INTERNAT’L AFFS. 139–56 (2020); Aris Roussinos, The
Irresistible Rise of the Civilisation-State, UNHERD (Aug. 6, 2020), https://unherd.com/2020/08/
the-irresistible-rise-of-the-civilisation-state; Adrian Papst, China, Russia, and the Return of the
Civilisational State, NEW STATESMAN (May 8, 2019), https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/05/
china-russia-and-return-civilisational-state.
191. Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS. (June 30, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang;
Christian Shepherd, Fear and Oppression in Xinjiang: China’s War on Uighur Culture, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77.
192. O’Sullivan, supra note 188, at 648.
193. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan III, Nontaxpayer Litigation of Income Tax Disputes, 3 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 73 (1984); Paul B. Stephan III, Bob Jones University v. United States: Public
Policy in Search of Tax Policy, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 33 (1983).
194. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan III, The Restructuring of Soviet Commercial Law and Its Impact on International Business Transactions, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 89 (1990); Paul
B. Stephan III, Labor Law in Russia—The Hopes and Fears of Post-Soviet Workers, 32 VA. J.
INT’L L. 789 (1992).
195. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (2018).
196. See, e.g., PAUL B. STEPHAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT (2011); PAUL B.
STEPHAN & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
197. Paul B. Stephan, Sovereignty and the World Economy, 17 U. St. Thomas L.J. 651–54
(2020).
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section is further divisible into three core insights. First, Stephan asserts that
sovereignty must not be seen as some mystical, indivisible singularity as
Bodin and his followers conceived of it. On the contrary, sovereignty must
be seen as a relationship. Sovereignty might rely on force, but it must also
have recourse to persuasion. It must, after all, be accepted by the governed,
and that means the sovereign must work hard to earn and keep the people’s
loyalty.198 (It should be added that there are affinities between Stephan’s
conception of sovereignty and that of the post–World War I jurist Léon
Duguit, who emphasized that sovereignty depends for its efficacy on social
interdependence and public service. The state that fails to render service to
its constituents is the state that will soon lose its legitimacy.)199
Second, since sovereignty is relational, it does not require for its existence a modern conception of the nation-state.200 Indeed, many forms of
premodern social organizations exercised sovereign power in ways that do
not correspond to the modern nation-state but that we would nevertheless
agree are real. And, since this is the case—Stephan is led to his third insight—there are nonstate entities today that similarly enjoy sovereign authority.201 For an example, Stephan points in particular to a concept he
labels “international sovereignty.”202 International sovereignty consists of
established norms and ways of doing business (for example, the doctrine of
jus cogens) and formal structures and institutions (for example, the United
Nations or the WTO).203
In his article’s second section, Stephan shifts tack to address the
knowledge economy and the political economy of the world.204 Here, again,
there are three core insights. Stephan begins with the “knowledge
worker.”205 His paradigm of the knowledge worker is the highly compensated technology engineer (think, for example, a search-engine designer for
Google) or the well-situated transactional lawyer (think a member of a major New York or London firm, tasked with developing ever more effective
forms of financial assets).206
These knowledge workers tend to reside in close proximity to one another in one or another of those emerging world cities—San Francisco, say,
or New York, or London, or Singapore. And to meet their daily needs, they
increasingly depend on poorly compensated pools of workers who fill roles
from nannies, to cooks, to Uber or Lyft drivers. As shorthand, Stephan la198. Id. at 651–52.
199. See DUGUIT, supra note 26; Martin Loughlin, The Functionalist Style in Public Law, 55
U. TORONTO L.J. 361 (2005).
200. Stephan, supra note 197, at 654.
201. Id. at 654.
202. Id. at 662–63.
203. Id. at 665–69.
204. Id. at 654.
205. Id. at 657.
206. Stephan, supra note 197, at 658.
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bels these two groups über and unter. The new urban proletariat, furthermore, is often distinguishable by being recent immigrants.207
But there is a third group of workers that Stephan also takes account
of, which he labels “the dispossessed.”208 The dispossessed might be former
industrial workers or their children. They live in the forgotten parts of the
nation—America’s so-called Rust Belt, for instance, or those parts of the
United Kingdom that voted heavily for Brexit. They lack the resources to
make the move to one of the world cities. They earn a living that is less than
their ancestors’ and lead lives that are disrespected by the elites. They have,
furthermore, come to resent their diminished place in the American (or British, or French) economic order.209
In his third section, entitled “Different Sovereignties in the World: Cooperation and Conflict,” Stephan ties together the seemingly disparate arguments he made in the first two sections of his article.210 There is probably
no more visible, tangible expression of “international sovereignty” in today’s world than international trade. Consisting of trade agreements among
nations, contracts among multinational corporations, and a thousand different arrangements among elite power brokers, international trade is what has
attracted the anger of the dispossessed.211
Stephan is at his most perceptive in discussing the economic plight of
the dispossessed.212 For cultural reasons, as well as for reasons of racial
grievance and its exploitation by powerful political players, the dispossessed of the heartland have been unable to make common cause with the
urban proletariat. But the dispossessed have been able at least to acquire
sufficient political power to checkmate and stymie movement in the direction of greater trade liberalization. Donald Trump was attempting to satisfy
precisely this constituency when he brought the Appellate Body of the
WTO to a full stop. Stephan himself is uncertain how all of this ends and
presents a range of possibilities, ranging from “doomsday,” to “utopia,” to
“muddling through.”213 My own guess—we muddle.
F. Itai Apter
There is a natural transition between Paul Stephan and Itai Apter.
Apter is an Israeli scholar, affiliated with the University of Haifa and the
Israeli Ministry of Justice, and he has chosen to write on the relationship of
international trade and social mobility. If there is a rising urban proletariat
and a deeply alienated class of the “dispossessed,” as Stephan convincingly
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 661–72.
Id. at 664.
Stephan, supra note 197, at 659.
Id. at 672.
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demonstrates, then, Apter asks, what can international law, in particular international trade law, do to remedy this crisis?214
Apter begins with the assumption—justifiable empirically—that the
lack of social mobility has become a crisis not only within the United States
but in many other nations.215 As the world has become less equal, it has
also become more stratified, as those with resources crowd out those who
lack the means of social ascent.216
Apter proposes to remedy this precise problem. When he speaks of
social mobility, he does not have in mind equality of results. Rather, he
states the case for a robust, meaningful equality of opportunity. Housing,
health care, education, the chance to meet and mingle among those who
have the connections to help one advance in the world—these are among
the key elements that constitute Apter’s understanding of equality of
opportunity.217
Apter’s argument is divisible into three main themes. First, he means
to state a philosophical and jurisprudential case for social mobility as a
value that should be the concern of international law.218 Particularly important to his case is the work of Ayelet Shachar of the University of Toronto
School of Law. There is something, Shachar asserts, arbitrary and capricious about the relationship of the accident of birth and the opportunities (or
lack of opportunities) that that primordial accident presents for the whole of
one’s life. As Shachar writes: “Access to affluent polities in our unequal
world is still reserved primarily to those born in a particular territory or to a
particular ancestry while at the same time shutting out everyone else born
on the wrong side of the border of security and prosperity.”219
Apter bolsters his philosophical case for enhancing social mobility
with a number of supporting arguments. Indeed, the philosophical tradition
provides Apter with a whole arsenal of justifications. Ancient Aristotelian
principles of distributive justice can be invoked to support a global program
aimed at improving social mobility, as could principles of corrective justice.
One might also consult Jeremy Bentham and the utilitarian tradition for
further support. It seems obvious that it is in the interest of the greatest
number to see all the members of society thriving, attaining their potential,
and contributing to the flourishing of the community.
Apter then turns to the means by which social mobility might be inscribed into law. One method he proposes is a conscious commitment on
214. Itai Apter, Utilizing International Law to Move the Jeffersons On Up to the East Side—
Exploring the Potential of International Law to Support Domestic Social Mobility, 17 U. St.
Thomas L.J. 679–706 (2020).
215. Id. at 679.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 683.
218. Id. at 681.
219. AYELET SHACHAR, Preface to THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY, at 000 (2009).
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the part of states, when entering or renewing free trade agreements, to
oblige themselves to improve social mobility. Indeed, Apter suggests that
where great disparities exist among states, subsidies (which he calls “incentive mechanisms”) might be made available to ensure that the “losers” of
the birthright lottery might still attain the promise of a better life.220
In addition to the “hard” commitments of free trade agreements, Apter
also proposes recourse to “soft law”—that indeterminate body of principles
to which “good” states ascribe.221 States, Apter suggests, might commit to
tracking social mobility within their territories. Global monitoring organizations—what Apter calls “international, intergovernmental organizations”—
might collate the data.222 And in a process of naming and shaming, states
that fail in their commitments might be identified and so suffer reputational
harm.223
Third, Apter turns to the body of international human-rights law as a
final buttress for his case. Human-rights law has long been committed to the
ideal of “equality.” But the term “equality” always prompts the question
“equal as to what?” Apter hopes to answer that question by reading into the
law of human rights a guarantee that all persons should have at least approximately similar chances at social advancement.224
One possibility Apter explores is the Sustainable Development Goals
to which the United Nations’ General Assembly committed itself in 2015.
Apter knows that General Assembly resolutions do not carry the force of
binding international law. Still, such a proposal falls beneath the rubric of
“soft law” and could constitute grounds for the eventual development of
customary international law.225
In conclusion, Apter notes that states have an interest in promoting
social mobility. He acknowledges—in common with Stephan—that there
are large and growing bodies of citizens within states who feel isolated and
alienated from the affluent parts of their own political communities and
who have accordingly turned to nationalist or populist political alternatives
that have as their common denominator opposition to international trade
and greater engagement with the world.226
There is the widespread perception, Apter concedes, that international
trade is “anathema to social mobility.”227 He is certainly correct on this
point. As we have noted above, “efficiency” remains a kind of foundational
norm for international trade. And while international tribunals have occa220.
221.
Meyer,
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Apter, supra note 214, at 694.
Id. at 695. For a working definition of “soft law,” see Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L.
International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 174–75 (2010).
Apter, supra note 214, at 696.
Id..
Id. at 700.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 704.
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sionally read into the law of international trade principles drawn from other
areas of law—consider, for example, the importance of environmental law
in the Shrimp/Turtle case—economic interests, narrowly construed, still
dominate the field.228 With this in mind, we must applaud Apter. He is
making a set of truly breathtaking claims. There is a radical edge to Apter’s
work, which he wisely camouflages, but which is nevertheless visible. And
that is that the law of international trade should be put to the task of achieving affirmative, substantive goals for the betterment of humankind.229 It is,
furthermore, vital that the world community take his arguments seriously.
Inequalities of wealth, race, and class are perhaps the most stubborn obstacles standing in the way of social development. Itai Apter has provocatively
proposed ways of mitigating and even, perhaps, reversing this lamentable,
dangerous, destabilizing fact of life.
G. Henry Carey and Stacey Mitchell
Henry Carey and Stacey Mitchell, finally, have written an important
retrospective on the work of the Princeton University international lawyer
Richard A. Falk. A few words first about Falk and then about our contributors. I became acquainted with Richard Falk’s work for the first time in
1974, when I was an undergraduate student at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. Falk had been called to give expert testimony at the sentencing of Karl Armstrong, who had been found guilty of bombing the
Army Mathematics Research Center on the University of Wisconsin–Madison campus.
Falk testified that the sentencing judge should take into account Armstrong’s claim to have been acting under the Nuremberg principles. In 1970,
the year the bombing occurred, the Vietnam War had metastasized into a
great evil, consuming hundreds of thousands of (mostly Vietnamese) lives
in an unworthy cause. Armstrong’s claim was that resistance in the face of
evil, even violent resistance, was justified.
By the time Falk testified, Armstrong had already accepted a plea bargain. He served about seven years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, Falk
supported Armstrong’s contention. “To stop the commission of great
crimes,” Falk testified, “one may have to commit lesser crimes. What is
illegal or criminal has to be understood in the context of the larger notion of

228. Appellate Body Report, US—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998); cf. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body
Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for Trade and Environmental Debate,
27 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 489, 505–08 (2002); Darren Hudson et al., Environmental Regulation
Through Trade: The Case of Shrimp, 68 J. ENV’T MGMT. 231, 232 (2003).
229. Apter, supra note 214, at 706.
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the illegality and criminality of war.”230 At our historical distance, it is difficult to know what effect Falk’s testimony had on the sentencing judge.231
But Falk’s testimony had a profound effect on me. I remember thinking that, yes, Armstrong was certainly guilty. Falk had admitted as much.
And certainly, Armstrong deserved punishment. But I also remember thinking that even the guilty—especially the guilty—deserve zealous representation and that Falk had nobly fulfilled that obligation. He was a lawyer who
put his own reputation on the line in defending an unpopular defendant
while raising an unpopular but necessary defense. As a twenty-year-old undergraduate, I was impressed with this example of courageous lawyering,
and I remain moved by it today.
Indeed, Richard Falk is one of the giants in the field of international
law. At ninety years old, his career spans more than sixty years. He remains
active today. A professor at Princeton University (and more recently at the
University of California–Santa Barbara), he counts among his former students a wide array of America’s foreign policy elite. Robert Mueller, the
former FBI director and special prosecutor, was a student of Falk’s.232 So
also was General David Petraeus.233 Falk, plainly, is broadly ecumenical in
the students he accepts and tutors.
Reviewing Falk’s contributions to international law are Henry Carey
and Stacey Mitchell. Professor Carey has written widely on themes such as
the role of nongovernmental organizations in “peace-building,”234 the transnational prevalence and reform of torture as an instrument of interrogation
and terror,235 the plight of the island nation of Haiti,236 and the condition of
the eastern European state of Romania.237 Professor Mitchell, for her part,
is an assistant professor at the Perimeter College campus of Georgia State

230. The Struggle Against Army Math, 6 SCI. FOR PEOPLE 24, 26 (1974).
231. For a history of these events, see RONALD CHRISTENSON, POLITICAL TRIALS: GORDIAN
KNOTS IN THE LAW 149–63 (2nd ed. 1999); STEFAN ANDERSSON, REVISITING THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: VIEWS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF RICHARD FALK 287–99 (Richard Falk
ed., 2018).
232. Richard Falk, I Was Robert Mueller’s Undergraduate Thesis Adviser—and What He
Wrote Gives Some Hints About What He’ll Do as Special Counsel, NATION (July 13, 2018), https:/
/www.thenation.com/article/archive/robert-muellers-undergraduate-thesis-adviser-wrote-giveshints-hell-special-counsel.
233. Patrick Lawrence, A Conversation with Richard Falk, Part 2, NATION (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/a-conversation-with-richard-falk-part-2.
234. HENRY F. CAREY, PRIVATIZING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: POLICY DILEMMAS OF NGO
PEACEBUILDING (2012).
235. HENRY F. CAREY, REAPING WHAT YOU SOW: A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF TORTURE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, ARGENTINA, AND ISRAEL (2012).
236. See, e.g., Henry F. Carey, The Third U.S. Intervention and Haiti’s Paramilitary Predicament, 11 J. HAITIAN STUD. 88 (2005).
237. See, e.g., Henry F. Carey, Legal Reform in Romania, 61 NEW ENG. J. HIST. 41 (2004).
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University, where she has written on genocide, particularly with respect to
the nation of Rwanda.238
Regarding the organization they adopt for their article, Carey and
Mitchell state that the work of “Richard Falk, the public intellectual, can be
divided into five major themes.”239 The first of these is “Vietnam, International Law, and the World Peace through Law Movement.” In this section,
Carey and Mitchell discuss Falk’s contributions to the debate over the Vietnam War, but their analysis ranges beyond this starting point to explore
Falk’s reasons for believing that the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions
would fail. Like the resistance of the Vietnamese to foreign subjugation, it
could have been predicted that American pacification in Iraq and Afghanistan would face steady popular opposition.
Under the title “The Nuclear Order,” Carey and Mitchell examine
Falk’s long-standing commitment to denuclearization. Nuclear weapons are
both a symbol and a potent source of power sustaining the state-based
Westphalian order, and Falk fears that nuclear arms have become so deeply
enmeshed with what it means to be a state, or at least a superpower, that a
course correction is possible only through catastrophe—say, an exchange of
nuclear arms.240
Beneath the rubric of “Complementarity,” Carey and Mitchell discuss
Falk’s belief that the world order must be “inclusive, not exclusive.”241
Whatever shape the emerging world order assumes, Falk urges that it not be
Western. That would be to privilege one civilization over other civilizations
and so violate the principles of inclusivity and complementarity.242 Western
“economistic secularism” is the basis of the present world order, and it has
failed—indeed, it has exacerbated “problems of poverty, inequality, [and]
conflict.”243 Carey and Mitchell read Falk as insisting that we must do
better.244
The section entitled “Environmental Concerns” traces Falk’s long-term
dedication to environmental issues.245 This was a focus of Falk’s work as
far back as the 1970s,246 and it remains a concern today.247 It is an issue
238. See, e.g., STACEY M. MITCHELL, INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES, DECISION FRAMES, AND POVIOLENCE IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI (2018).
239. Henry F. Carey & Stacey M. Mitchell, Richard Falk’s Cosmopolitan View of Sovereignty: The Ambition of Necessity to Pursue World Order Through Law, 17 U. St. Thomas L.J.
711 (2020).
240. Id. at 717.
241. Id. at 724.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 726.
244. Id.
245. Carey & Mitchell, supra note 239, at 727.
246. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR
HUMAN SURVIVAL (1971).
247. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, A Radical World Order Challenge: Addressing Global Climate Change and the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 7 GLOBALIZATIONS 137 (2010); Richard A.
LITICAL
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that in Falk’s eyes challenges the contemporary state-based system of international law. States now act in pursuit of their short-term interests. They
jockey for advantage in a competitive world. They seek to maximize their
positions vis-à-vis other world actors. Climate change, however, challenges
the premises behind these established ways of business as it requires not
short-term thinking but far-sighted cooperation.248
Finally, Carey and Mitchell address the question of the Palestinian occupation. Richard Falk has been a consistent critic of “the international
community[‘s]” “double standard” on “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”249
Falk finds unacceptable a world order that sees Israeli treatment of Palestinians as justified on national “security” grounds, while it condemns Palestinian resistance as “terrorism.”250 If one wanted to, one could draw a line
connecting the Richard Falk who defended Karl Armstrong and the Falk
who has assertively taken up the Palestinian cause. Falk has never stopped
being that lawyer who defends the unpopular cause in the face of entrenched opposition.
One must, however, add three further observations to Carey and
Mitchell’s article, for it seems to me that it contains three meta-themes that
cut across the topics that the authors analyze. First, there is Richard Falk’s
commitment to a noncoercive international order. He views the present
state-based system, grounded on a seventeenth-century compromise, the
Peace of Westphalia, as hopelessly out of date. The Westphalian system is
predicated on state interests, state power, state authority, and national sovereignty. It submerges—i.e., it makes invisible—the human beings who are
the subjects of this system.251
Second, Falk would have us build a renewed world order grounded on
justice. This is a vision of justice, furthermore, that is not state-centric but
rather human-centric. It places the human person at the heart of the international order and dares to imagine the construction of new collaborative,
cooperative institutions in place of the failed old order.252
Third, Falk is unrelentingly optimistic. He is a believer in humanity
and has faith that we can build a better world. And in truth, if one asked
him, he might say that we really have no choice. The crises that confront us
today—from COVID, to climate change, to a crumbling old order—are so
Falk, Apollo’s Curse and Climate Change, GUERNICA (Oct. 4, 2012), https://
www.guernicamag.com/richard-falk-apollos-curse-and-climate-change; Richard A. Falk, Climate
Change, Policy Knowledge, and the Temporal Imagination, in REIMAGINING CLIMATE CHANGE 49
(Paul Wapner & Hilal Elver eds., 1st ed. 2016).
248. Carey & Mitchell, supra note 239, at 728.
249. Id. at 729.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 733.
252. Id.
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profound that we must, we simply must, begin building, and we must do so
at once.253

253. Id.

